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Abstract 
Most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. However, social effort is not 
restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes to public programs. 
OECD-data indicate that accounting for private social benefits has an equalising effect on levels of social 
effort across a number of countries. This suggests complementarity between public and private social 
expenditures. But their distributional effects differ. Using cross-country data, we find a negative relationship 
between net public social expenditures and income inequality, but a positive relationship between net private 
social expenditures and income inequality. We conclude that changes in the public/private mix in the 
provision of social protection may affect the redistributive impact of the welfare state. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In recent years considerable progress has been made in empirical research on public and private social 
protection expenditures. Adema [2001] has recently done a comprehensive study on net social expenditure. 
His OECD-data indicate that accounting for private social benefits and the impact of the tax system on social 
expenditure has an equalising effect on levels of social effort across a number of countries. This suggests 
complementarity between public and private social insurance. However, cross-country differences in the 
public/private mix in the provision of social protection, and cross-country differences in social policy aspects 
of tax systems may have distributional effects. Do public and private arrangements in social protection 
systems have (dis)similar distributional effects? 
In this paper, we will investigate the relationship, if any, between cross-county differences in the 
public/private mix in social protection and the distribution of income in 16 wealthy nations. We analyse both 
the effects of accounting for private social benefits, and the impact of the tax system on social protection 
statistics, and link both net public social spending and net private social spending to indicators of income 
inequality. Especially the link between income inequality and private arrangements (on average 9.4 percent of 
total net social expenditures across countries) is unclear at this stage. This relationship is also relevant from a 
policy point of view. In some countries welfare systems have been reformed fundamentally in recent years. 
E.g. the Netherlands has changed the public/private mix of social protection rather drastically. Recent 
reductions in public benefit levels have to a large extent been offset by supplementary private benefits, often 
negotiated in collective wage agreements. As far as pensions are concerned, there is also a trend towards a 
higher share of supplementary private benefits in total income.  
The scope of this paper should be clarified at this stage. Our purpose is to present a simple and intuitive 
analysis which elaborates on previous work. Caminada and Goudswaard [2001] studied the cross-country-
relationship between changes in inequality and changes in welfare state policies as measured by social 
expenditure ratios, and as measured by replacement rates, in the period 1980-1997. They found several 
countries that combined an above-average rise in inequality with a reduction in the generosity of the welfare 
system. In this paper we incorporate private social benefits and the impact of the tax system on social 
expenditure in our analysis. Ideally we would have taken into account the dynamic effects of change in this 
analysis as well because it is important to analyse the path of change across countries. However, we have to 
restrict the analysis to one moment in time because time-series on cross-county differences in the 
public/private mix in social protection are not (yet) available. This paper uses the only cross-country data 
available, for one moment in time (around 1997).  
The aim of the paper is not to explain the household income distribution across countries, nor will we discuss 
the direction of the causality of the relationship between across country differences in income inequality and 
the levels of social spending. Such an analysis should be based on a theory which would have to address 
several cross-national differences explaining the household income distribution [cf. Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1997]. Such a comprehensive approach is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises empirical results of the level of income 
inequality across countries. In section 3 we discuss the influence of cross-county differences in the 
public/private mix in social protection on the distribution of income. Next we present the results of cross-
country analyses on gross and net social expenditures (section 4). In section 5 we will perform an empirical 
analysis on (net) public and private social expenditures, and the distribution of income. Section 6 concludes 
the paper.  
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2 Empirical evidence on income inequality at one point in time 1 
 
The best cross-nationally comparable collection is the Luxembourg Income Study [LIS]. LIS was created 
specifically to improve consistency across countries. The LIS data are a collection of micro data-sets 
obtained from a range of income surveys in various countries. The advantage of these data is that 
extensive efforts have been made by country specialists to make information on income and household 
characteristics as comparable as possible across a large number of countries. The approach adopted by LIS 
overcomes most, but not all, of the problems of making comparisons across countries that plagued earlier 
studies [Smeeding, 2002].  
This section summarises the evidence on cross national comparisons of annual disposable income 
inequality over 29 nations based on empirical evidence from Gottschalk and Smeeding [1997 and 1998], 
and Smeeding [2000], and others using data from the LIS. We summarise empirical results of the levels of 
income inequality across countries around 1997. Levels of inequality can be shown in several ways, e.g. by 
Lorenz curves, specific points on the percentile distribution (P10 or P90), decile ratios (P90/P10), and 
Gini coefficients or many other summary statistics of inequality. All (summary) statistics of inequality can 
be used to rank income inequality in OECD countries, but they do not always tell the same story.  
Figure 1 shows two summary measures of the income distribution - the P90/P10-ratio and the Gini 
coefficient. Countries are listed in order of their Gini coefficients from smallest to largest. The obvious 
advantage of the presentation of inequality by summary statistics is its ability to summarise several nations 
in one picture. Figure 1 indicates that a wide range of inequality exists across developed nations, with the 
nation with the highest inequality coefficient (Mexico) over twice as high as the nation with the lowest 
coefficient (the Slovak Republic).  
 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
Other inequality indices would alter the country-ranking to some extent. However, the relative inequality 
patterns found here correspond roughly to the results found in Atkinson et al. [1995], and Smeeding 
[2002], which use earlier years’ LIS data in most cases.2  
 
 
3 Social protection and income inequality across countries 
 
Most nations have designed systems of social protection to shield their citizens against the risk of a fall in 
economic status due to unemployment, divorce, disability, retirement, and death of a spouse. We briefly 
review the growing literature on redistribution by governments (and/or social policy) and income 
inequality. The relationship between economic inequality and social spending is one of mutual 
interdependency in which it is crucial to distinguish specific types of social spending, which are affected by 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that income inequality has continued to increase in the large majority of the world’s rich 
nations over the past decade [Atkinson 2000]. 
2 Plots of Lorenz curves for several countries would allow us to see whether pairs of countries can be ranked by 
the standard Lorenz Dominance criteria. If the Lorenz curve that represents a distribution lies entirely inside 
another one, it can unequivocally be said that the country represented by the outside Lorenz curve is more 
unequal than the one represented by the one that lies inside. In case of Lorenz Dominance several summary 
measures of inequality (e.g. Gini, and Atkinson Indices) will rank the distributions uniformly. However, if Lorenz 
curves do cross, than the way in which different inequality measures rank two different distributions depends on 
the importance each gives to different parts of the distribution [Atkinson, 1970]. Several measures may therefore 
- 3 - 
different aspects of inequality [Swabisch et al., 2003]. Smeeding [2002] showed that social policies, wage 
distributions, time worked, social and labor market institutions and demographic differences all have some 
influence on why there are large differences in inequality among rich nations at any point in time. 
However, in this paper we focus on social protection systems only. 
The substantial differences in income inequality across welfare democracies are well documented [e.g. 
Föster, 2000; Atkinson et al., 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997].3 These differences are often 
attributed to the institutional structure of social policies. Föster’s empirical analyses showed that in most 
developed countries, between one third and 45 percent of all public transfers goes to the lower incomes.4 In 
general, tax/transfer systems as a whole reduce market-income inequality in all OECD countries. Moreover, 
cross-country correlations show a rather strong negative relationship between social expenditures and income 
inequality [e.g. Cantillon et al., 2002, and Atkinson, 2000]. Countries that spend less on their safety nets 
suffer higher levels of inequality, and vice versa. Korpi and Palme [1998], for example, showed that 
welfare states with generous social insurance programs redistribute economic resources more effectively 
and have a more equal distribution of incomes than welfare states with less generous insurance schemes.  
 
Usually the impact of social policy on the distributions of income is calculated in line with the work of 
Musgrave, Case and Leonard [1974], i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis.5 That is, important issues 
of tax/transfer shifting and behavioural responses are ignored.6 The measure of the redistributive impact 
of social protection on inequality is straightforwardly based on formulas developed by Kakwani [1986] and 
Ringen [1991]: 
Redistribution by government = (primary income – disposable income) / (primary income) x 100 
This formula is also used in Table 1 to estimate the reduction in inequality caused by social protection, 
where primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-transfer incomes and 
disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of disposable equivalent incomes. 
Table 1 shows the Gini income inequality before and after taxes/transfers and the inequality reduction 
coefficient in ten countries in the mid-1990s for households where the head is between 25-59 years. The 
figures in Table 1 give some evidence. For example Sweden, Denmark, and Norway achieve a greater 
redistribution of economic resources compared to Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States. It 
turns out that the latter countries are in fact those with the least equality, while Sweden, Denmark, and 
Norway are countries with a rather low degree of income inequality.  
 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 
However, the results in Table 1 do not show the redistributive impact of separate parts of social protection 
                                                                                                                                                        
value and rank one and the same income distribution differently [Champernowne, 1974]. See also Bazen and 
Moyes [2003] on the international comparisons of income distributions. 
3 An important development has been the Luxembourg Income Study in which micro data-sets from countries have 
been harmonised. Consequently it is possible to study income inequality across countries. Föster [2000] summarises 
trends and driving factors in income distribution and poverty on the basis of a harmonised questionnaire of OECD 
Member Countries (i.e. distribution indicators derived from national micro-economic data). 
4 Figures refer to the distribution of non-pension transfers; the lower income groups refer to the three bottom deciles 
of the working-age population.  
5 See e.g. Ervik [1998] for a comparative analysis of taxes, tax expenditure transfers and direct transfers in eight 
countries. 
6 See for a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by Smolensky et al. [1987]. However, models that 
include e.g. behavioral links are beyond the scope of existing empirical work [Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1998, p. 
3]. Therefore, researchers have restricted themselves largely to accounting exercises which decompose changes in 
overall inequality into a set of components.  
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systems. Recent literature suggests that the determination of the relationship between social expenditures 
and inequality should be carried out on a disaggregated basis [see Swabisch et al., 2003]. Ferrarini and 
Nelson [2002] showed that only a limited number of studies have attempted to specify the link between 
specific social transfer programs and income inequality. Thereby, the knowledge about the institutional 
structures that produce certain distributive outcomes is limited. Especially earlier studies that decompose 
inequality into specific transfers do not pay sufficient attention to the problem of taxation of social 
insurance. To gain a deeper understanding of the redistributive mechanisms of the welfare state it is 
necessary to disaggregate the social transfer system into program specific components [see e.g. Caminada 
and Goudswaard, 2001 and 2002].  
 
Although one new and appealing feature in this literature is the determination of the relationship between 
social expenditures and inequality on a disaggregated basis, we found no literature focussed on the 
distibutional impact of private social benefits. It is plausible that the redistributive effects of transfers are 
weaker in countries where programmes mostly rely on earnings-related schemes compared to countries 
with mostly (public) means-tested provisions of transfers. Private insurance schemes are actuarially fair as 
a rule. Most private insurances are not earnings-related. Individual private pension insurances, for example, 
have a defined contribution character, and therefore do not contain any elements of (ex ante) income 
redistribution. Private schemes can also have earnings-related benefits. It is sometimes argued that 
earnings-related social insurance benefits only reproduce inequalities in market income and therefore do 
not redistribute economic resources between income segments, in case benefits are perfectly earnings-
related and the risk of being in receipt of benefit is equally distributed in the population. So, in that case a 
higher share of private social protection will not have any (partial) effect on the distribution of income. 
However, private earnings-related schemes may not be actuarially fair and may contain elements of 
solidarity. This is often the case when (supplementary) private schemes are negotiated by social partners in 
collective labour contracts. These schemes are mandatory for (a group of) workers. Defined benefit 
pension schemes, for example, generally redistribute resources both within generations (for instance 
through redistributive elements such as thresholds or ceilings) and across generations (risk sharing, 
backservice). Defined benefit systems for early retirement tend to redistribute to members who leave 
before the official retirement age from those who stay. In fact, as we will mention in the next section, 
private social programs by definition contain elements of interpersonal redistribution.  
Also, tax advantages (to households or to employers) can be used to stimulate the provision of private 
benefits. This is often the case in supplementary pension programs, where contributions are tax exempt. 
The fiscal advantages related to, for example, supplementary private pension plans are positively related to 
income levels in most countries. In general, as Ferrarini and Nelson [2002, pp. 14-15] showed, social 
insurance is less equalising after taxation in all countries.  
At this stage the distributional impact of taking account for private social schemes in a cross-country 
analysis is not fully clear. Private arrangements will certainly have less redistributional effects compared to 
public programs. In addition, it is plausible that mainly higher income groups will make use of private 
social schemes [Casey and Yamada, 2002]. Considering also that private schemes often have favourable tax 
treatment (deductibility of contributions), which benefits the rich, it is possible that private social 
expenditure has a positive effect on income inequality. In other words, we expect income inequality to be 
relatively high (low) in countries where the share of private arrangement in the total social benefits is relatively 
high (low).  
 
 
4 Public and private social expenditures 
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For his OECD-study, Adema [2001] has developed indicators that aim to measure what governments 
really devote to social spending, net public social expenditure, and what part of an economy’s domestic 
production recipients of social benefits draw on, net total social expenditure. This requires capturing private 
social benefits and the impact of tax systems on social effort.  
Adema [2001, p. 9] defines private programs as ‘social’ when they serve a social purpose and contain an 
element of interpersonal redistribution. However, the demarcation of private social benefits is less 
straightforward than for public benefits. Private social programs can be mandatory or voluntary. 
Mandatory private benefits are often incapacity related. In several countries employers are obliged to 
provide sickness benefits.7 In some countries public disability benefits (and sometimes unemployment 
benefits) can be supplemented by private benefits with mandatory contributions, agreed upon in collective 
negotiations between employers and employees.8 A number of EU-member states have supplementary 
employment-based pension plans with mandatory contributions, based on a funding system. Voluntary 
private social security covers a wide range of programs, of which private pension plans and private social 
health insurance constitute major components. But again, there has to be interpersonal redistribution 
involved. Thus, for voluntary private plans to be labelled as 'social', they need to be fiscally advantaged, or 
contain some legal stipulation. Purely private insurance programs are excluded. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that the OECD-data only refer to institutional arrangements that are close substitutes to public 
programs. Consequently, only benefits provided by institutions are included, while transfers between or 
within households, albeit of a social nature, are not.  
 
The impact of the tax system on the social effort is threefold. In some countries cash benefits are taxable 
as a rule, in other countries they are not. In the former countries net social effort is less than suggested by 
gross spending indicators. Indirect taxation of consumption by benefit recipients is another factor that 
may blur the picture. When indirect taxes are higher, benefit recipients have less effective purchasing 
power. And thirdly, the tax system can be used for social purposes. Tax deductions (e.g. family tax 
allowances) replace direct expenditures in some cases. The Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States 
is a good example of a tax break, which has the features of a social protection program. Also, tax 
advantages (to households or to employers) can be used to stimulate the provision of private benefits. This 
is often the case in supplementary pension programs, where contributions are tax exempt.  
 
Table 2 presents figures on the net social expenditure as % GDP for 1997. The picture shows an 
international comparison of all countries for which information is available on net social spending 
indicators: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Most social support is publicly provided. In the European countries the share of public social 
benefits in total social expenditures exceeds 90 percent, except in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. However, the role of private arrangements of varying nature in providing close substitutes to 
public social protection expenditure is considerable in some OECD countries: 30 percent of all social 
benefits in the US and almost half of all social benefits in Korea. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
                                                 
7 In the Netherlands all sickness benefits are paid by employers since the privatisation of the sickness benefit 
program. 
8  Again, the Netherlands is a good example. Occupational injuries and accidents (‘risque professionel’) can also be 
covered by mandatory private insurances. 
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The data indicate that accounting for private social benefits has an equalising effect on levels of social 
effort across countries. We calculated the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation.9 Both 
measures show that the variation of social expenditure decreases in case private benefits are taken into 
account (compare column 2 and column 3, or column 4 and column 5). This suggests complementarity 
between public and private social expenditures. Apparently, preferences for the level of protection do not 
differ as much between countries as often suggested. Lower public protection may induce private social 
arrangements of different nature. But a shift from public to private provision of social protection can also 
be an explicit policy objective, to alleviate public budgets, or to strengthen incentives in the system. For 
example the privatisation of the sickness benefit program in the Netherlands was directed at increasing the 
incentives for employers to reduce the number of beneficiaries.  
Accounting for taxes substantially reduces the average expenditure ratio (compare column 3 and 5). 
Especially the Nordic countries and the Netherlands put high tax levies on social benefits and ensuing 
consumption. This effect clearly outweighs the effect of tax breaks for social purposes, that increase social 
expenditure. The impact of the tax system on social expenditure also has an equalising effect on levels of 
social effort across the eighteen countries. The coefficient of variation drops by 16 percent, while the 
standard deviation even drops by 30 percent. Especially within the EU Member-countries (10 EU 
countries are included) differences in total net spending levels are small. Perhaps surprisingly, the net 
expenditure ratio of the US is higher than the OECD average (for the countries included), and only one 
percent point of GDP lower than the EU average (for the EU counties included) .  
 
Obviously, this straightforward analysis is too simple to draw far-reaching conclusions. The evidence 
presented is only descriptive and does not explain differences in the public/private mix in social 
protection systems in the European Union and in the OECD. It should also be noted that differences 
across countries in expenditure ratios do not (always) reflect social policy. They may also reflect 
differences in unemployment rates or demographic structure across countries. Expenditure ratio’s can thus 
only be considered as rough indicators of welfare state policies. 
 
 
5 The link between public/private social protection and income inequality 
 
Cross-country differences in the public/private mix in social protection may have distributional effects. 
Obviously, countries differ in the extent to which social policy goals are pursued through the tax system 
and/or in the role of private provision within social protection systems. We observe that national 
preferences for social protection differ substantially across countries. Especially Anglo-Saxon countries do 
not seem to be prepared to sustain the high protection levels prevailing in other countries with the same 
level of income. This may be an expression of cultural differences within the group of OECD countries. 
These differences could point to variance in the re-distributional nature of social systems as well. Private 
social programmes may generate a more limited re-distribution of resources than public ones, and tax 
advantages towards private pension and health plans are more likely to benefit the rich. Private 
employment-related social benefits mostly re-allocate income between the (formerly) employed 
population. The same holds for fiscal advantages related to, for example, supplementary private pension 
                                                 
9 A property of the standard deviation is that its value rises with the average value of the data set to which it is 
applied. To account for this, we also use the so-called coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the value of the average of the corresponding data set. 
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plans. In general, we do expect that private schemes will generate less income redistribution than public 
programs (see section 3). 
We performed a cross-county analysis of the relationship between public and private social expenditures and 
the income distribution. Obviously, this analysis is not very sophisticated. The material presented is only 
descriptive and does not explain the household income distribution. Such an analysis should ideally be based 
on a theory, which would have to address at least the following cross-national differences [cf. Gottschalk and 
Smeeding, 2000, p. 263]: differences in labour markets that affect earnings of individual household members; 
difference in sources of capital and in returns to capital; demographic differences, such as the ageing of the 
population and growth of single parent households, which affect both family needs and labour market 
decisions; and differences across countries in tax and transfers policies that not only affect family income 
directly, but also may affect work and investment decisions. Such a comprehensive approach is far beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
Table 3 illustrates a cross national comparison of annual disposable income inequality for sixteen wealthy 
nations also listed in Table 2.10 Countries are listed in order of their Gini coefficient of adjusted disposable 
household income. The highest inequality is found in the United States, while Nordic and Benelux countries 
are the most equal nations. We see that Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Germany, 
Denmark, Czech Republic, and Austria have Gini coefficients in the range of 0.247 to 0.266. Canada, 
Australia, Japan, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States have somewhat higher coefficients 
(0.291 to 0.368).  
 
 
TABLE 3 
 
 
Seven countries combine an above-average level of net public social expenditure (% GDP) with a below-
average level in income inequality; six other countries combine relatively high levels of inequality with 
relatively low levels of public social spending. Moreover, it appears that some countries combine an above-
average level of inequality with an relatively small share of public social expenditure in total net social 
expenditure, especially the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. These are 
indications that support our hypothesis. For the group of countries with relatively low levels of inequality, 
we would expect the opposite. Indeed, the share of public social expenditure in total net social expenditure 
is relatively high in Sweden, Finland, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Czech Republic, Germany, and Austria. 
For a group of countries, however, the picture seems less clear: Italy, Ireland, Japan, and the 
Netherlands.11  
In Figure 2, we have plotted the average level of net public social expenditure (% GDP) and the average level 
of the Gini coefficient for countries, where both data-items are available. Both averages are represented by 
the cross of both axes: 19.6 percent for net public expenditures, and 0.286 for Gini. Several countries show 
levels in social security transfers above this average. Other countries combine a below-average level of net 
public social expenditure (% GDP) with a above-average level in income inequality. We find a pretty good 
                                                 
10 For two countries listed in Table 2 (New Zealand and Korea) we do not have figures for the level of income 
inequality around 1997. Therefore, we can not include New Zealand and Korea in our empirical analysis. 
11 Caminada and Goudswaard [2001] studied the cross-country-relationship between changes in inequality and changes 
in welfare state policies in the period 1980-1997. They found several countries that combined an above-average 
rise in inequality with a reduction in the generosity of the welfare system. For example, the Netherlands 
combined a relative sharp increase in income inequality with a quite fundamental reform of the welfare state; 
almost 40 percent of the increase in inequality in the period 1981-1997 can be attributed to income transfers. 
Another important force was a more unequal distribution of market income. Their budget incidence analysis thus 
indicates that social security reforms have had an important impact on increasing inequality in the Netherlands. 
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fit of a OLS-regression with the level of the Gini and the level of net public social spending (a similar 
regression is done by Gouyette and Pestieau, 1999); see Figure 2 (panel a). Using net public expenditure as 
dependent variable produces the expected negative sign, while the coefficient is statistically significant. 
Obviously, net public social security transfers are well-targeted towards the poor.  
 
The picture alters when we take private social security expenditures into account in our analysis; see Figure 
2 (panel b). A negative relationship between net private social expenditures and inequality can not be found. 
This is confirmed by a simple regression analysis reported in Table 4. The estimated coefficient of net 
private expenditure-variable is significant, and positive. Again, these are indications that support our 
hypothesis that public and private arrangements in social protection do have opposite distributional 
effects. This positive (rather than a negative) sign may reflect that higher income groups find it easier to 
opt in to private social programs. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
 
Other inequality indices do not alter the results. Table 4 reports several regressions with various income 
inequality measures. In all cases, we find a pretty good fit of OLS-regressions with the level of the income 
inequality measures and the levels of both net public and net private social spending. The estimated 
coefficients of net public and net private expenditure-variables are significant. However, public and private 
arrangements in social protection do have opposite distributional effects (opposite signs). 
 
Notice that private arrangements mitigate the impact of public social effort on income inequality to a large 
extent. In fact, we do not find a significant impact of net total social spending on income inequality in our 
cross-country analysis. Our OLS-regression results show that the estimated coefficient of the net total 
expenditure-variable is – in all cases - negative, but not significant. This result may come as a surprise, 
because the share of private arrangements in total net social expenditures is rather small across countries (on 
average 9.4 percent). As a result of the divergent effects of net public social expenditure versus net private 
social expenditure, the relationship between total social expenditures and income inequality across 16 wealthy 
countries appears to be statistically trivial.  
 
 
TABLE 4 
 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
Calculations with OECD-data indicate that accounting for private social benefits and taxes has an equalising effect 
on social effort across countries. This suggest complementarity between public and private social expenditures on 
an aggregate level. But what about the distributional impact of public versus private arrangements? We performed 
a cross-county analysis, which is obviously not very sophisticated. We analysed this question empirically on a cross-
country basis. Such an analysis should ideally be based on a theory, which would have to address several cross-
                                                                                                                                                        
However, after the social security reforms, both the generosity of the Dutch income transfer system and the level of 
income equality are still quite high in an international perspective. 
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national differences explaining the household income distribution. Such a comprehensive approach, however, is 
far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Our material nevertheless does support a divergent relationship between income inequality and public versus 
private social expenditures across countries. Accounting for private social arrangements (and for the impact of 
the tax systems) matters as far as the distributional impact of the social protection is concerned. We find a negative 
relationship between net public social expenditure and income inequality, and a positive relationship between net 
private social expenditure and income inequality. The impact of total expenditures (public ánd private) on income 
inequality across 16 wealthy countries appears to be statistically trivial. As a result, changes in the public/private 
mix in the provision of social protection may indeed affect the redistributive impact of the welfare state. 
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References 
 
Adema, W. Net Social Expenditure: 2nd edition, Labour Market and Social Policy - Occasional Papers 52, 
Paris: OECD, 2001. 
Atkinson, A.B. ”On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2, September 1970, pp. 
244-263. 
Atkinson, A.B. ”The Changing Distribution of Income: Evidence and Explanation,” German Economic Review, 
1, 1, February 2000, pp. 3-18. 
Atkinson, A.B.; Rainwater, L.; Smeeding, T.M. Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the 
Luxembourg Income Study, OECD Social Policy Studies 18, Paris: OECD, 1995. 
Bazen, S.; Moyes, P. International Comparisons of Income Distribution, Luxembourg Income Study Working 
Paper Series 341, Luxembourg, 2003. 
Caminada, K.; Goudswaard, K.P. ”International Trends in Income Inequality and Social Policy,” 
International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 4, August 2001, pp. 395-415. 
Caminada, K.; Goudswaard, K.P. ”Income Distribution and Social Security in an OECD Perspective,”, in: 
Roland Sigg and Christina Behrendt (eds.), Social Security in the Global Village, International Social 
Security Series, 8, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick / Londen, 2002, pp. 163-188 
Cantillon, B.; I. Marx; Van den Bosch, K. ”The puzzle of egalitarianism. About the relationships between 
employment, wage inequality, social expenditures and poverty”, CSB-Berichten (Centrum voor Sociaal 
Beleid UFSIA), Antwerp, Belgium, December 2002. 
Casey, B.H.; Yamada, A. The Public-Private Mix of Retirement Income in Nine OECD Countries: Some Evidence from 
Micro-data and an Exploration of its Implications, Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series 311, 
Luxembourg, 2002. 
Champernowne, D.G. ”A Comparison of Measures of Inequality of Income Distribution,” Economic Journal, 
84, December 1974, pp. 787-816. 
Cornelisse, P. A.; Goudswaard, K.P. ”On the convergence of social protection systems in the European 
Union”, International Social Security Review, 55, 3, July-September 2002, pp. 3-17. 
Ervik, R. The Redistributive Aim of Social Policy. A Comparative Analysis of Taxes, Tax Expenditure Transfers and Direct 
Transfers in Eight Countries, Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series 184, Luxembourg, 1998. 
Ferrarini, T.; Nelson, K. The Impact of Taxation on the Equalising Effect of Social Insurance to Income Inequality: A 
Comparative Analysis of Ten Welfare States, Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series 327, 
Luxembourg, 2002. 
Föster, M. Trend and Driving Factors in Income Distribution and Poverty in the OECDF Area, Labour Market and 
Social Policy Occasional Papers 42, Paris: OECD, 2000. 
Gottschalk, P.; Smeeding, T.M. ”Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 35, June 1997, pp. 633-687. 
Gottschalk, P.; Smeeding, T.M. Empirical Evidence on Income Inequality in Industrialized Countries, Luxembourg 
Income Study Working Paper Series  154 (revised), Luxembourg, 1998. 
Gottschalk, P.; Smeeding, T.M. ”Empirical Evidence on Income Inequality in Industrialized Countries,” in 
A.B. Atkinsin; F. Bourgignon (eds.), Handbook of Income Distribution, New York: Elsevier-North Holland 
Publishers, 1, 2000, pp. 262-307. 
Gouyette, C.; Pestieau, P. ”Efficiency of the Welfare State,” Kyklos, 52, 4, 1999, pp. 537-553. 
Kakwani, N.C.  Analyzing Redistribution Policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Korpi, W.; Palme, J. ”The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare Institutions, 
Inequality and Poverty in the Western Countries,” American Sociological Review, 63, 5, October 1998, pp. 
661-687. 
- 11 - 
Luxembourg Income Study, 'LIS Key Figures’ and ‘LIS Information Guide - Revised February 1998', 
Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series no. 7, Luxembourg, 1998. LIS-website 
http://www.lisproject.org/. 
Musgrave, R.A.; Case, K.E.; Leonard, H.B. ”The Distribution of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits,” Public Finance 
Quarterly, 2, July 1974, pp. 259-311. 
Ringen, S. ”Households, standard of living and inequality,” Review of Income and Wealth, 37, 1, March 1991, pp. 
1-13.  
Smeeding, T. ”Changing Income Inequality in OECD Countries: Updated Results from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS),” in: R. Hauser; I. Becker (eds.), The Personal Distribution of Income in an International 
Perspective, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2000, pp. 205-224. 
Smeeding, T. Globalization, Inequality and the Rich Countries of the G-20: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS), Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series 320, Luxembourg, 2002. 
Smolensky, E.; Hoyt, W.; Danziger, S. ”A Critical Survey of Efforts to Measure Budget Incidence,” in: H.M. 
van de Kar; B.L. Wolfe (eds.), The Relevance of Public Finance for Policy-Making, Proceedings IIFP Congress 
1985, Detroit, pp. 165-179. 
Swabisch, J.; Smeeding, T.; Osberg, L. Income Distribution and Social Expenditures: A Cross-National Perspective, 
Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series 350, Luxembourg, 2003. 
 
- 1 - 
FIGURE 1 
Summary measures of the income distribution  (adjusted disposable household income) 
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Note: Data refer to adjusted disposable income based on data from LIS; Gini coefficients are based on income 
which are bottom-coded at 1 percent of median disposable income and top coded at 10 times the median 
disposable income.  
 
Source: LIS Key Figures [http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm, download 16-03-2004], with the exception for 
Japan [source: Smeeding, 2000, p. 211]  
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TABLE 1 
Disposable income inequality in ten welfare states, around 1995: Gini coefficient  
before and after taxes/transfers 
 
 Gini before taxes/transfers Gini after taxes/transfers redistribution 
    
Belgium 0.355 0.217 38.9 
Canada 0.389 0.288 25.9 
Denmark 0.360 0.240 33.2 
Finland 0.365 0.257 29.7 
Germany 0.390 0.293 25.0 
Netherlands 0.380 0.267 29.9 
Norway 0.328 0.219 33.0 
Sweden 0.391 0.205 47.5 
United Kingdom 0.470 0.347 26.2 
United States 0.419 0.350 16.4 
Average 0.385 0.268 30.6 
 
Source: Ferranini and Nelson [2002] 
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TABLE 2 
Net social expenditure (% GDP), 1997 
(ranked according net social expenditure) 
 
Country 
 
Gross  
public social 
expenditure 
(2) 
Gross  
total social 
expenditure 
(3) 
Net  
public social 
expenditure 
(4) 
Net  
total social 
expenditure 
(5) 
Share  
net private 
expenditure 
(6)=[((5)-(4))/(5)]*100
      
Sweden 31.8 34.8 25.4 27.3 7 
Germany 26.4 28.6 24.6 26.1 6 
Belgium 27.2 29.5 23.5 25.4 7 
Denmark 30.7 32.0 22.9 23.5 3 
Italy 26.4 27.8 21.6 22.7 5 
Finland 28.7 30.0 21.4 22.1 3 
Austria 25.4 27.0 20.9 22.0 5 
United States 14.7 22.9 15.3 21.8 30 
United Kingdom 21.2 24.9 19.2 21.8 12 
Norway 26.1 27.2 21.1 21.7 3 
Netherlands 24.2 29.1 18.2 21.5 15 
Australia 17.4 21.7 16.6 20.4 19 
Canada 17.9 22.1 16.2 18.9 14 
New Zealand 20.7 21.3 17.0 17.5 3 
Czech Republic 19.0 19.4 17.2 17.2 0 
Ireland 17.6 19.2 15.4 16.5 7 
Japan 14.2 15.1 13.9 14.7 15 
Korea 4.3 8.4 4.4 8.3 47 
      
Average 21.9 24.5 18.6 20.5 9,4 
Coefficient of variation 0.316 0.263 0.265 0.220 1.242 
Standard deviation 6.91 6.45 4.93 4.52 11.64 
      
Average EU Members 26.0 28.2 21.3 22.8 6.5 
Coefficient of variation 0.155 0.141 0.136 0.127 0.602 
Standard deviation 4.02 3.98 2.90 2.88 3.94 
 
Note: Social expenditures include the following areas: old-age cash benefits; disability cash benefits; occupational 
injury and disease; sickness benefits; services for the elderly and disabled; survivors; family cash benefits; 
family services; active labour market policies (ALMPs); unemployment compensation; housing benefits; 
public health expenditure; and other contingencies e.g., cash benefits to those on low income. 
 We relate social spending indicators to GDP at market prices rather than GDP at factor cost (as Adema 
does), because GDP at market prices is the most frequently used indicator of the size of an economy. 
 
Source: Adema [2001], and own calculations 
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TABLE 3 
Social protection and summary measure of the income distribution 
 
Country Year Gini 
Coefficient 
Net Public and Private Social Expenditure (% GDP), 1997
   public private 
     
average  0.286 19.6 1.9 
     
above-average     
United States 2000 0.368 15.3 6.5 
United Kingdom 1999 0.345 19.2 2.6 
Italy 2000 0.333 21.6 1.1 
Ireland 1996 0.325 15.4 1.1 
Japan 1992 0.315 13.9 0.8 
Australia 1994 0.311 16.6 3.8 
Canada 1997 0.291 16.2 3.7 
     
below-average     
Austria 1997 0.266 20.9 1.1 
Czech Republic 1996 0.259 17.2 0.0 
Denmark 1997 0.257 22.9 0.6 
Germany 2000 0.252 24.6 1.5 
Sweden 2000 0.252 25.4 1.9 
Norway 2000 0.251 21.1 0.6 
Belgium 1997 0.250 23.5 1.9 
Netherlands 1999 0.248 18.2 3.3 
Finland 2000 0.247 21.4 0.7 
 
Source: Adema [2001] and LIS Key Figures [http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm, download 16-03-2004], 
with exception of Japan [Smeeding, 2000, p. 211], and own calculations 
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FIGURE 2 
Cross country differences in social expenditures and Gini coefficient, around 1997 
 
(a) Net public social expenditures 
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(b) Net private social expenditures 
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Source: see below Table 3; and own calculations 
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TABLE 4 
Impact of net social expenditure (% GDP) on income inequality around 1997 
 
Dependent variable Intercept Net public social 
expenditure 
Net private social 
expenditure 
Net total social 
expenditure 
adj. R2
   
0.040  -0.460* 0.033*  
(0.22) (-3.16) (1.78)  0.426
-0.112   -0.329 
Gini Coefficient 
(-0.41)   (-1.61) 0.095
   
1.440  -0.690* 0.063*  
(5.54) (-3.42) (2.41)  0.511
1.142   -0.441 
Decile Ratios P90/P10 
(2.74)   (-1.41) 0.061
   
-0.160  -0.783* 0.067*  
(-0.46) (-2.88) (1.92)  0.420
-0.502   -0.498 
Atkinson Index (ε=0.5) 
(-0.98)   (-1.29) 0.043
   
0.062  -0.717* 0.080*  
(0.19) (-2.80) (2.43)  0.461
-0.331   -0.395 
Atkinson Index (ε=1.0) 
(-0.65)   (-1.03) 0.004
 
Note: Logarithmic OLS-regression; t-statistics in parentheses.  
 
* significant at 95%-level 
 
Source: see below Table 3, and own calculations 
 
 
 
 
